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Introduction 
 
 The question of forgiveness in politics has attained a certain cachet.  Indeed, in 
the fifty years since Hannah Arendt commented on the notable absence of forgiveness in 
the political tradition, a vast and multidisciplinary literature on the politics of apology, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation has emerged.1 A number of historical events can account 
for this sudden turn: the efforts of former Soviet Bloc countries to acknowledge state 
spying and other infractions on the rights of their citizens; the establishment of truth 
commissions in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile (among others) to investigate state-sanctioned 
disappearances, kidnappings and tortures; and, perhaps most famously, the work of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa.2 At the same time, there 
have been gestures by parties to World War II on both sides of the conflict to apologize 
and repair for various war crimes and infractions, and settler societies like Canada, the 
USA and Australia have been called to task for past injustices by various members of 
their own citizenry: indigenous peoples, the descendants of former slaves, linguistic and 
ethnic minorities, and immigrant groups who have suffered from discrimination and 
exploitation. 
 
  Analyses of these new politics typically touch on the potential role for a political 
notion of forgiveness, although few have provided a detailed or consistent theoretical 
explanation of what would make an act of forgiveness political, and what distinguishes 
political forgiveness from its more familiar counterparts in everyday life.3  Instead, this 
task has fallen to philosophers, and they have embraced it with no small degree of 
cynicism. To a novice scouring the relevant literatures, it might appear that the only 
discordant note in this new veritable symphony of writings on political forgiveness has 
been sounded by philosophers writing on the topic.  Where others see new hope for 
politics, philosophers fear an uncritical promotion of forgiveness, which risks distorting 
and cheapening forgiveness as a moral ideal, on the one hand, and ignoring justice, 
accountability and the need to end harmful relationships, on the other.4  After all, when 
philosophers take up the question of forgiveness, it is usually in order to shape it into 
                                                 
1 Forgiving… has always been deemed unrealistic and inadmissible in the public realm”. See Arendt 1958: 
243. 
2 For more detailed, empirical analyses of these events, see Haynor 2001, Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd 
2000, Andrews 1999. 
3 Peter Digeser (2001) is a notable exception to this; I discuss his account of political forgiveness below. 
Trudy Govier also offers a detailed analysis of forgiveness between groups, and in political contexts – most 
specifically the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission – although she does so by extending 
the Emotional Model to account for group resentment. See Govier 2002: 90-92. 
4 The work of Jeffrie Murphy (1988) and, more recently, Thomas Brudholm (2008) represent excellent 
examples of this cynicism. 
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something resembling a rationally defensible moral ideal.5 This ideal, many argue, 
depends on the rich nature of our private interpersonal relationships, and the space for 
trust, empathy and emotional expression afforded by them.  Once transported to the 
political realm, forgiveness is subject to inevitable distortion and decay.  
 
 Are philosophical fears about the dangers of thinking about forgiveness in 
political terms warranted – or do they perhaps depend in part on conceptual conservatism 
regarding what exactly political forgiveness might be? In this paper, I will make the case 
that most – if not all – objections to political forgiveness emerge from theoretical reliance 
on a picture of forgiveness I will call the Emotional Model. Once we make conceptual 
space for descriptions of forgiveness in performative and social terms, the concept is 
more easily adapted to a political account without the risks feared by philosophers. 
 
 My argument takes the following form. First, I present and briefly defend a 
multidimensional account of forgiveness. Next, I consider how best to understand 
forgiveness as political. Third, I respond to the major objections to extending forgiveness 
to political contexts, in turn: 
 
1. Political actors have no right to forgive on behalf of individual victims; 
2. Forgiveness imports inappropriate and illiberal notions of deep, psychological 
change into politics. 
3. Only persons, not collectivities, can forgive. 
 
My answers to each of these draws partly on the account of multidimensional account of 
forgiveness I advocate.  Finally, I consider a slightly different sort of objection to 
political forgiveness. Given that, as I have argued, forgiveness is a personal reaction to 
wrongful harm, forgiveness cannot be a political matter because: 
 
4. Acts of political forgiveness cannot be grounded in the appropriate kinds of 
reasons. 
 
I counter this claim by examining some political grounds for forgiveness.  Having argued 
that there are no unanswerable philosophical objections to forgiveness as a political 
concept, I conclude by reflecting on some of the forms that political forgiveness might 
take.  Obviously the politics and particularities of reconciliation are enormous: the main 
purpose of this discussion is to remove some of the most salient philosophical objections 
to political policies that employ the language of forgiveness.  While the language of 
forgiveness may be more or less appropriately applied (depending on the context of the 
political dispute) to policies of amnesty, pardon, or apology, as gestures of reconciliation 
or restoration, certain examples of each are capable of performing the work of 
forgiveness. 
 
                                                 
5 I discuss the philosophical interest in forgiveness qua ideal, and some its shortcomings, in another paper.  
I argue that the mainstream philosophical approach to forgiveness results in a narrow and unhelpful set of 
dichotomies: we either resent or forgive; either forgiveness is deserved or it is unwarranted; either 
forgiveness is conditional on repentance or it is unconditional. See MacLachlan 2009. 
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A Working Theory of Forgiveness 
 
 Since forgiveness is very much a part of the everyday moral of the contemporary 
western world, it makes sense for a theory of forgiveness to take, as its starting point, 
‘average’ or ‘everyday’ understandings – insofar as these can be extracted.6  In 
philosophy, forgiveness is typically understood as a personal reaction to wrongful harm, 
which both confronts the wrongdoing qua wrongdoing and is characterized by either a 
shift from a negative to a positive stance toward the wrongdoer, or the adoption of a 
positive stance when a negative one is expected.  Philosophers have also argued that the 
change of stance in forgiveness is essentially – or ideally – characterized in cognitive-
affective terms: that is, as the effort to overcome or reduce resentment, undertaken for 
moral reasons. I call this the Emotional Model of forgiveness, since it characterizes 
forgiveness essentially as a change in emotion.7  Outside of philosophy, on the other 
hand, social practices of forgiveness are varied. Acts of forgiveness can manifest 
themselves as primarily affective (a change in feelings), cognitive (a change in judgments 
and attitudes) and/or socially performative (participation in some established action or 
ritual – perhaps the simple acts of saying “I’m sorry” and “I forgive you”). While many 
typical cases of forgiveness will have elements of all three, no one dimension – affective, 
cognitive or performative – is essential to ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ forgiveness.  In other words, 
I advocate a multidimensional account of forgiveness. In long-standing and complex 
relationships marked by distrust and resentment on both sides, words of forgiveness alone 
may be deeply unsatisfying – and somewhat suspicious.  In a more casual, distant or 
formal relationship, talk of deep emotional change or moralized judgments might actually 
exaggerate and sustain what would otherwise have been minor, even fleeting hostilities.  
What ‘counts’ as an act of forgiveness, will depend in part on whether those involved see 
it as such. 
 
 How then do we determine when someone has forgiven? Since practices of 
forgiveness vary in their expression, we can better understand what constitutes an act of 
                                                 
6 Here, any philosophical author confronts the danger of speaking in the voice of an authoritative “we”, 
presuming social and cultural homogeneity where there is little or none.  Contemporary notions of 
forgiveness in English-speaking philosophy draw heavily on the cultural inheritance of the Judaic, 
Christian and Islamic religious traditions, as well as cultural norms that have developed in European 
cultures. Jacques Derrida (2001) has written about how this “Abrahamic” tradition of forgiveness is now 
writ global. I am not convinced that this is a fait accompli and suspect that social practices of forgiveness, 
like social practices of apology, admit of significant cultural variation. For a discussion of cultural variation 
in practices of apology, see Renteln (2008). 
7 Trudy Govier has rightly noted that the term “Emotional Model” suggests that she and others reduce 
forgiveness to a matter of mere feelings when in fact she understands it primarily as a change in reactive 
attitudes, which have cognitive and volitional content not reducible to feelings.  Let me be clear, therefore, 
that I understand emotions to be complex adaptive responses to certain situational factors, often socially 
experienced and understood, an episode of which may or may not include physiological changes, ways of 
feeling, motivations and dispositions to act in certain ways and – importantly – particular thoughts, 
perceptions and evaluations of this situation. In other words, rich emotional experiences like resentment 
include but are not reducible to evaluative construal of the agent’s environment that is open to rational 
assessment. Thus, in overcoming resentment, the forgiver – on the Emotional Model – experiences a 
change in attitude, perception and evaluation of the wrongdoer, which takes place for moral reasons. 
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forgiveness by examining its function or meaning to those involved rather than looking 
for a singular phenomenology of emotion, gesture, or performance.  An act of forgiveness 
can have three functions: it can release the wrongdoer from emotional remainders like 
subjective guilt, it can offer relief to the wrongdoer (or indeed, the victim) and it can 
assist in the repair of right relationships, trust and the re-establishment of moral values.8  
The nature of a particular act of forgiveness will depend very much on the context in 
which it arises: the characters of forgiver and forgiven, the relationship between them, 
and the extent of the original harm.  Finally, we forgive for a multiplicity of reasons; 
these reasons are typically drawn from the context of the harm, the wrongdoer’s 
subsequent behavior and the forgiver’s anticipation of future states of affairs. The 
forgiver’s reasons may also appeal to broader norms and values she takes to be important 
(e.g. the importance of interpersonal harmony). In many situations, our reasons to forgive 
are compelling but not conclusive; thus, potential forgivers have a certain amount of 
discretion regarding when it is appropriate to forgive.  When we forgive for good reasons, 
however, our actions respond appropriately to the moral needs of the victim and 
wrongdoer, contribute to morally valuable states of affairs, and are capable of expressing 
moral values of trust, compassion and sensitivity. 
 
 
 Making Forgiveness Political 
 
 When theorists take up the question of ‘political’ forgiveness, they often have in 
mind large-scale cases of wrongdoing between social and political groups on a national, 
or even international, scale.9  Yet there are plausible counterexamples to the claim that all 
political forgiveness is collective forgiveness, and vice versa.  Equating the two would 
exclude those cases where individual political actors (state representatives) seek or offer 
forgiveness, except insofar as they represented a larger collectivity, and there are 
plausibly cases of political forgiveness where those individuals involved (as victim and 
wrongdoer, in any case) speak for themselves alone.10 For example, many of the cases 
heard by South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission involved atrocities 
                                                 
8 The three functions of forgiveness can be seen in the multiple metaphors used to describe it we talk about 
forgiveness as a change of heart, or the decision to turn the other cheek, but equally, forgiving can wipe 
clean the slate, release the wrongdoer (and victim) from the burden of the harm, remit the wrongdoer’s 
moral debt, or function as a gift. 
9 Trudy Govier moves quickly from discussing skepticism over forgiveness in politics to asking, “can 
groups forgive?” Donald Shriver also speaks of political forgiveness as a “collective turning from the past,” 
and Mark Amstutz claims: “political forgiveness represents an extension of interpersonal forgiveness to the 
actions of collectives.”  See Govier 2002: ix, Shriver 1995: 9 (italics added); Amstutz 2005. 
10 Nicholas Tavuchis’ (1988: 48) taxonomy of “structural configurations of apology and forgiveness” is 
helpful here. Tavuchis divides apologies (and gestures of forgiveness) into four categories: 
One to One 
One to Many 
Many to One 
Many to Many 
Tavuchis assumes that the first is interpersonal, and the other three importantly different from the first. He 
is right to acknowledge the implications of a public apology, but in dismissing the first, perhaps fails to 
consider the role of the public as witness (or relevantly located third party) in politically charged acts of 
One-to-One (interpersonal) forgiveness. 
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committed by a single individual against another, within the context of systemic political 
oppression and struggle.  In those cases, politics entered the equation as the motivation 
for the wrong, the context that made such occurrences possible, and in the scene of 
(possible) forgiveness: a public, state-mandated tribunal with the power to grant amnesty.  
Furthermore, we can imagine situations of collective forgiveness that are not especially 
political in nature: for example, collective forgiveness among members of an extended 
family or between factions of friends, fans of two rival sports teams, or colleagues in a 
workplace dispute.  
 
Instead, we might recognize that much of the philosophical work on interpersonal 
forgiveness takes as its starting point, a very particular (if familiar) kind of interpersonal 
relationship: most typically, a casual friendship or acquaintance between agents who are 
relatively equal, and fairly independent from one another – friends, neighbours, or 
colleagues.  But a philosophical theory of forgiveness that aimed to be comprehensive 
would need to apply to a wide variety of interpersonal relationships (partners, family, 
friends – ranging to complete strangers or new introductions), while acknowledging that 
these relationships vary in importance to the agents involved, as well as in closeness, 
affection, knowledge of the other, and in power. Rather than treating political forgiveness 
as a sui generis phenomenon, to be contrasted with interpersonal forgiveness understood 
as a singular paradigm, we might recognize how forgiveness potentially emerges from 
within a host of different types of relation – with political relationships being one type 
among these (admittedly, one with its own unique complications). 
 
Finally, any straightforward contrast between ‘personal’ and ‘political’ 
forgiveness risks the implication that all acts of forgiveness not identified as political 
forgiveness are thus somehow apolitical.  Yet forgiveness occurs in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing between agents – and in many cases, individual acts of wrongdoing reveal 
deeper asymmetries of power, voice and privilege.  Theorists of forgiveness would do 
well to attend the second-wave feminist adage, ‘the personal is political’, in order to 
appropriately attend to the political dimensions of forgiveness following, for example, an 
act of gendered domestic violence, a schoolyard racist slur, or workplace exploitation 
between employer and employee from different class backgrounds. 
 
 Thus, I propose the following definition of political forgiveness.  An instance of 
forgiveness is political, when it takes place in one of the following three types of 
circumstances: 
 
(1) Forgiveness between collectivities that are clearly recognizable as politically 
constituted or organized, or between their mandated representatives (e.g. 
states, political organizations, ethnic groups or other national minorities, or 
between groups of marginalized and disadvantaged individuals and the larger 
political society). 
 
(2) Forgiveness between individuals or groups whose primary relationship, or the 
relationship in question (i.e. that relationship implicated in the wrongdoing), is 
political, for e.g. forgiveness for politically motivated or politically charged 
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wrongdoings: hate crimes, for example, or the torture of political prisoners 
and hostages, as well as individual acts that are part of – and made possible by 
– wider systemic state policy (e.g. atrocities committed under apartheid 
policies).11 
 
(3) Forgiveness enacted as part of – or in service to – the ongoing process of 
making the conditions for political society possible (that is to say, a broader 
political effort to establish lasting peace, build democratic institutions, and 
take responsibility for past political wrongdoing).12 
 
 While the first set of circumstances will entail collective forgiveness, if any, both 
the second and the third set can produce political forgiveness without it necessarily being 
collective.  Yet insofar as they concern the structure and arrangements determining a 
political society and arise in the aftermath of political conflict, instances of forgiveness in 
(2) and in (3), whether individual or collective, are reasonably described as political. 
 
 In fact, philosophical discussions of political forgiveness suffer from a failure to 
recognize how many different events and processes are already referred to under the 
rubric of political forgiveness (whether or not those writing subscribe to a broad account 
of forgiveness, as I do).  Those arguing for or against the possibility of political 
forgiveness describe it, in turn, as a collective effort to engage in “knowing forgetting,”13 
a collective “process of overcoming resentment and anger,”14 “the decision to relieve 
individuals and groups from their moral debts or deserved punishments,”15 specific 
decisions to pardon or offer debt relief,16 a value that must be present for any successful 
political policy of reconciliation,17 or the authoritative academic discourse governing 
contemporary political transition.18 While I do not necessarily object to any one of these 
qualifying as an act of political forgiveness, this kind of equivocation can confuse the 
question of whether political forgiveness is a good idea. It is not always easy to know 
what collective, knowing forgetting might entail, or how the specific decisions to pardon, 
relieve punishment or release moral debts might contribute to the collective process of 
overcoming resentment. Those who endorse and those who criticize political instances of 
forgiveness are often talking past one another.  
                                                 
11 I realize, of course, that (2) could include any act of crime between two citizens, provided they did not 
have a prior personal relationship. I do not intend to discuss forgiveness in judicial systems – at least not in 
those of a functioning democracy – at this point. I focus on political wrongdoing rather than purely criminal 
wrongdoing. However, I am open to the possibility that much of my analysis could be applied to 
discussions of restorative justice in the ordinary functioning of a criminal justice system, as well as 
situations of political upheaval and change. 
12 This last set of circumstances is very much in keeping with a claim by Hannah Arendt (1958: 198) that 
forgiveness is fundamentally a political faculty, since she claims that political activity always concerns 
itself with the conditions of its own possibility; that is, we are political when we act in order to create or 
sustain conditions of public plurality and debate. 
13 Elshtain 2001: 42-56. 
14 Govier 2002: viii. 
15 Amstutz 2005: 77. 
16 Digeser 2001: 7. 
17 Rigby 2001: 184. 
18 Moon 2004: 185. 
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 This is exactly why the multidimensional account of forgiveness is helpful for its 
political application.  Perhaps even more than in the case of interpersonal forgiveness, 
there are clearly multiple, competing and sometimes conflicting intuitions about the 
character of political forgiveness.  Those writing on the topic struggle to combine acts, 
policies and the occasionally intangible effects of broader social change into a single 
philosophical concept.  Thus, treatments of political forgiveness in the literature will refer 
to the following distinct phenomena almost interchangeably, without acknowledging a 
shift in reference: 
 
i) A specific act or government policy of reconciliation or peace-making: for 
example, the decision to implement truth commissions, to grant collective 
amnesty to perpetrators, to offer an individual political pardon, to issue a 
public apology or to make (or accept) an offer of reparation following harm. 
 
ii) Individual acts or events that take place within the context of such policies: 
for example, the actual ceremony of apology between two heads of state, or 
the ‘scenes’ of forgiveness between individual victims and wrongdoers that 
Desmond Tutu describes as taking place in the context of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
 
iii) The goal or end result of such policies; this third category treats political 
forgiveness as a synonym for a rich notion of political reconciliation. Thus, 
political forgiveness – in this sense – is achieved when such acts or policies 
are concluded with some standard of success, or to the satisfaction of those 
involved. 
 
iv) A side effect of these policies, such as a widespread shift in general social 
attitudes and behaviors between former victims and perpetrators.  This could 
be measured by a number of indicators, including media reports, polling, 
records of inter-community incidents and police reports, success of integrated 
schooling, and through cultural artifacts like novels, films, plays, and songs. 
 
v) A value governing policies and process of social reconciliation, a value 
usually listed alongside truth telling, justice and peace. Such values function 
as reference points for the mandates and commitments of specific committees, 
task forces, commissions, and so on. 
 
 One might endorse policies described in i) without insisting on a rich notion of 
reconciliation, like iii) – or equally, promote the kind of broader social change described 
in iv) without believing that specific government policies or actions are the best way to 
achieve it.  Finally a government or set of governments could demonstrate commitment 
to forgiveness as a value (as in v) without implementing any of the specific policies in i) 
or ii).   
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Which one of these is ‘real’ political forgiveness?  First, I see good reason not to 
condemn any of these scenarios as necessarily incomplete – or to view them necessarily 
as partial fragments of a larger, unified real ‘political forgiveness’. In the first place, it is 
unclear what (or how desirable) that larger, unified phenomenon is: that is, how i) 
through v) are all necessarily required for any particular process of political transition (or 
reconciliation with history) to meet relevant moral and political standards.19 Second, 
there may be times when items on the list actually conflict or are in tension with one 
another, as when policies listed in i) and ii) detract from the broad social change 
described in iii) and iv) or do not represent the best strategy for striving to meet and 
respect the values described in v). And finally, even if all five were potentially 
compatible, in a given case, I see reason to resist treating their combination as ‘real’ 
forgiveness; such a phenomenon would represent a difficult, almost impossible ideal, for 
those struggling through the messy, difficult and heart-wrenching business of 
reconciliation; impossible ideals can discourage and undermine moderate successes in 
peacemaking.20 
 
 Should the length and complexity of the list above lead us to dismiss the question 
of political forgiveness as incoherent or ill formed?  I think not, for the following reason: 
there is power in the language of forgiveness, accrued from its legacy in many of the 
religious, cultural and literary discourses of the western world.21  This power is 
potentially valuable and the functions I attributed to forgiveness – relief, release and 
repair – are very much needed in the aftermath of political conflict.  We have at least a 
prima facie reason to keep looking for a workable definition of political forgiveness, even 
if that definition turns out to be more pluralistic and particularistic than some would like.  
Once we accept that forgiveness is already a multidimensional set of overlapping acts and 
practices, the appropriate questions shift from “whether political forgiveness?” to “which 
act of political forgiveness, if any, is appropriate here and now?” We can focus on how 
these different acts and occasions of political forgiveness intersect, cause and react with 
one another, which (if any) are most politically valuable in a particular situation, and how 
we can best understand the political grounds for these acts of forgiveness and the 
conditions under which they are morally, as well as politically, appropriate.   
 
I return to the potential moral and political values grounding political forgiveness in my 
conclusion. First, however, I take up the major objections to political forgiveness, and 
demonstrate how they can be answered. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 For an excellent discussion of the appropriate moral and political standards, please see Murphy 2010. 
20 I am grateful to Nir Eisikovits, another contributor to this volume, who brought this point home to me in 
his talk entitled “Truce!” at a focal conference on reconciliation, held at the Boston University Institute for 
Philosophy and Religion in March 2009. 
21 Of course, this legacy is sometimes as problematic as it is powerful. As I note elsewhere, the Christian 
overtones of forgiveness, in particular, and the association between Christianity and European global 
colonialism may give reason to avoid discourses of forgiveness in some post-colonial situations of 
reconciliation.  Also, conflicting religious understandings of forgiveness may render it a contested topic in 
conflicts inflected by religious difference, such as Northern Ireland or Israel and the Palestinians. 
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First Objection: Political Actors Cannot Forgive for Victims 
 
“No government can forgive… No commission can forgive… Only I can forgive. And I 
am not ready to forgive.” – a South African woman reacting to the testimony of her 
husband’s killer at a TRC hearing.22 
 
 This woman’s testimony encapsulates much of what people find disquieting, even 
distasteful, about political applications of forgiveness.  There is something alarming in 
imagining a situation where the choice to forgive is taken from victims, or they are 
unduly influenced.  Such a situation offends against the elective character of forgiveness, 
the particularistic nature of the reasons we have to forgive or not forgive, and also, belies 
the respect we rightly assume is due to those who have suffered wrongful injury.  
Victims’ forgiveness should not be politically mandated. 
 
 But acts and policies of political forgiveness, even as enacted by a government or 
political body, need not be mandated victims’ forgiveness.  In cases of serious, political 
wrongdoing, it is unlikely that the primary victim of wrongdoing was the only person 
harmed.23 Furthermore, not all acts of forgiveness are victims’ forgiveness, primary or 
other.  As several philosophers have argued, not only are there plausible instances of 
secondary and tertiary victims’ forgiveness, but under certain conditions the so-called 
victim’s prerogative can legitimately be extended to relevantly connected third parties: 
those who have a prior relationship to the wrongdoing, and who are prepared to engage 
appropriately with the victim’s experience.24  These are not equivalent to the primary 
victim’s forgiveness, but they may also play an important role in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing.  In a society torn about by civil war, for example, it is likely that very many 
people will find themselves in at least a position of a secondary or tertiary victim, as well 
as of a relevantly connected third-party; sadly, there is no shortage of relevant 
connections to harm. 
 
 Nevertheless, the argument that forgiveness by a government or state falls neatly 
into third-party forgiveness is perhaps a little too quick.  While third-party forgiveness 
does not, in theory, replace victim’s forgiveness, there is a danger that the initiative to 
forgive, if taken by others, may feel like pre-emption to the victim.  This danger is 
magnified exponentially when the others whose initiative it is to forgive act from 
positions of institutional authority and political power.  Proponents of the South African 
TRC, for example, note that the commission’s mandate was truth for amnesty on behalf 
of society, not forgiveness on behalf of victims; it offered the occasion for individual acts 
of victim’s forgiveness, but did not compel or command them.  However, in early 
hearings, Archbishop Desmond Tutu would sometimes ask victims if they were ready to 
forgive and reconcile after they had recounted their stories. A request from such a 
charismatic, morally authoritative figure, made in a public forum, may well have felt like 
                                                 
22 As recounted by Desmond Tutu and by Alex Boraine, Deputy Chair of the TRC. Cited in Ash, 1997: 36. 
Also cited in Gutmann and Thompson, 2000: 31 and Derrida, 2001: 43. 
23 For a discussion of primary, secondary and tertiary victims of wrong, see Govier and Verwoerd, 2002. 
24 For discussions of third-party forgiveness, see MacLachlan 2008, Norlock 2009, Pettigrove 2009 and 
Radzick 2009. 
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pressure to conform to the wider political culture of forgiveness and reconciliation.25  
Similarly, the leaders of a particular group may accept the official apology of another 
group before all their constituents are prepared to put the wrongdoing in the past.  In 
doing so, they may have the power, effectively, to put the question to rest before victims 
would like. 
 
 An institutional expression of forgiveness carries authority that other acts of third-
party forgiveness may not. Not only is its voice more powerful than those of individual 
victims but also, in some cases, it has been elected to speak on their behalf.  And it is 
simply true that sometimes the political leadership of a particular group is prepared to 
forgive before all members of the group are prepared to do so – or to endorse the 
equivalent public action.26  But of course this is not always a bad thing.  Cultures of 
enmity and resentment can become so deeply entrenched that it appears impossible to 
imagine a resolution to longstanding social and political conflict.  Political decisions to 
forgive – manifested as the cessation of hostility, promotion of better relations, or 
agreements to power-share, to hold truth hearings instead of trials, or to grant amnesty for 
moral-political reasons – may play an important role in shifting the broader culture.  
External researchers investigating the long-term effects of the TRC on particular South 
African townships noted, “it appears that for the most part the Commission has 
contributed to a greater commitment to the process of reconciliation.”27 Sometimes 
policies of forgiveness may be an extremely effective part of wider political peace 
making. While respect and reparation will always be important ways of honoring victims’ 
experiences, assuming that in all cases policies of forgiveness must be postponed until 
each individual victim has done the same risks over-sanctifying the victims’ position, at 
tremendous cost.  
 
 Finally, not all acts of political forgiveness are acts of third-party forgiveness. 
Gutmann and Thompson suggest: “crimes like those committed against apartheid are acts 
not only against particular victims but also against society and state.  In addition to the 
victims of crimes having something to forgive, so do society and state.”28  Insofar as 
entire groups can be harmed by violence, injustice, and discrimination, their political 
leadership may have the appropriate standing to forgive as secondary or tertiary victims 
of wrong.   
 
 The relationship between government acts of forgiveness and individual victims’ 
forgiveness is variable, and must be negotiated carefully.  While the quotation with which 
                                                 
25 See Haynor 2001: 156, Brudholm 2008: 30-31, and – especially – see Verdoolaege’s discussion in this 
volume of the reconciliation discourse at the TRC. 
26 Indeed, a political leader may be prepared to enact political forgiveness before he or she has personally 
met the criteria articulated by the Emotional Account (i.e. overcoming his or her own, individual 
resentment). I am indebted to Mathias Thaler for directing me to consider how public acts of apology of 
forgiveness, when given by figures who are privately ambivalent or resentful, may be instances of 
hypocrisy with ‘civilizing force’ described by Judith Shklar. For more discussion, see Shklar 1984, 45-86. 
27 Taken from a report by Hugo van der Merwe, The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and Community Reconciliation, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 1998. 
Cited in Haynor, 2001: 157.  
28 Gutmann and Thompson, 2000: 30. 
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I began this section expresses one victim’s frustration at a politically negotiated process 
of forgiveness, a second quotation is cited nearly as often, expressing the need for exactly 
this process: “I am ready to forgive, but I need to know whom I have to forgive. If they 
would just speak up and acknowledge what they have done, they would be giving us the 
opportunity to forgive.”29  Insofar as some acts of forgiveness incorporate profoundly 
personal changes of attitude and beliefs, it seems that these cannot be politically 
commanded, nor can a commission or a government perform them on behalf of an 
individual victim.  A political body can set the scene for individual acts of deeply 
emotional forgiveness, and can even promote it as part of a wider culture.   
 
 The extent to which such political efforts will be interpreted as forceful or 
coercive will depend on the sensitivity and wisdom of the policy in place.  Furthermore, 
there are other plausible practices of forgiveness in which a government or political body 
appears perfectly able to participate on behalf of its constituents: issuing and accepting 
official apologies, making other public gestures of conciliation and contrition, welcoming 
estranged perpetrators back into civil society by re-establishing certain civil rights, for 
example, or waiving penalties for the appropriate reasons.  Indeed, individual victims will 
never have the power to perform these acts.  One final note regarding political 
forgiveness and victims’ forgiveness: I have spoken of a political relationship between a 
powerful political body and its (presumably) less powerful citizens.  The dangers of 
authority and coercion reduce when the parties in question are two groups of roughly 
equal power or two political actors; forgiveness could end a political feud, for example, 
or hostilities between two heads of state. 
 
 
Second Objection: Political Forgiveness is Illiberal 
 
 There is a second source of discomfort with political forgiveness, which once 
again arises from the intuition that forgiveness is personal and thus private, best kept 
between individuals.30 Politics should not concern itself with the deep-seated sentiments 
and attitudes motivating the behavior of political actors; forgiveness involves a ‘change 
of heart’, and the state has no place in the hearts of its citizens. In other words, the second 
objection begins from the premise that forgiveness is always a matter of deep 
psychological attitudes, namely, the effort to overcome resentment and restore goodwill. 
In a liberal society, we cannot demand that citizens feel a certain way towards one 
another, so forgiveness is ruled out from the start. 
 
                                                 
29 Cited in The Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Part Three, 
Chapter Four. Accessed Online at the United States Institute of Peace 
(http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/chile/chile_1993_pt3_ch4.html) 
30 Timothy Garton Ash warns that political forgiveness, as “reconciliation of all with all” is a deeply 
illiberal idea while Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson note that a certain degree of moral disagreement, 
and even animosity, is important to a flourishing democracy See Ash 1997: 37 and Gutmann and 
Thompson, 2000. Rich notions of forgiveness and reconciliation, they argue, deny the space for debate and 
accountability that is required for a healthy political society.  Peter Digeser, 2001: 17, describes a fear of 
‘politics as soul-craft’ as generating much of the skepticism surrounding political forgiveness. 
The Philosophical Controversy Over Political Forgiveness  
Alice MacLachlan, York University  
12 
 Not surprisingly, this objection is very much geared toward the Emotional Model 
of forgiveness.31  If one accepts the premise of the Emotional Model, then there are two 
possible responses to the claim that emotional work has no place in politics.  The first is 
to bite the bullet, and reject the liberal premise of a political sphere free from thick moral 
and emotional demands.  Mark Amstutz takes this approach, arguing for an explicitly 
communitarian account of political reconciliation.32  Political forgiveness, as Amstutz 
sees it, resembles the change in attitudes and rich reconciliation described in iii) and iv) 
listed above.  
 
 The other possible response from within the framework of the Emotional Model, 
is to accept that standard notions of forgiveness just cannot be applied politically, but to 
argue for a secondary, related account of specifically political forgiveness.33  Peter 
Digeser does this, focusing only on the image of debt relief; in politics, “to forgive means 
to release what is owed, either financially or morally” and so an act of political 
forgiveness “relieves what is due and is done for reasons.”34 In focusing on public 
commitments to release debt (moral or political), Digeser argues for what he calls an 
action-based rather than sentiment-based theory of political forgiveness.  Yet Digeser 
discounts the role of attitudes and sentiments in the political realm perhaps a little too 
quickly; it is not clear that political acts of forgiveness always take place according to the 
model of debt relief.  For example, sincere gestures of respect, contrition and acceptance 
can play an important ‘face-saving’ role, particularly in international relations.  Here, the 
scene of forgiveness resembles a collective change of attitude or a symbolic effort to 
‘turn the other cheek’ more than it does the release of what is due. 
 
 Viewing forgiveness according to the Emotional Model demands either that we 
choose between all or nothing: either we always appeal rich emotional attitudes and 
personal responses to explain an act of political forgiveness or we create a separate, 
restricted notion of political forgiveness that merely resembles its interpersonal cousin, 
excluding affective dimensions altogether.  The former sits uneasily with liberals, and 
while the latter could account for policies of pardon, collective amnesty and  – arguably – 
decisions not to retaliate violently against aggression, it cannot explain many political 
practices of truth-telling and reconciliation, institutional apologies and their acceptances, 
or more general political exhortations to forgive collectively.  Thus, neither response is 
ultimately satisfying.  Attitudes and subjective responses are a larger part of political life 
than Digeser gives them credit, but not all acts of political forgiveness require deep 
emotional change. 
 
                                                 
31 Implicated are those theorists who argue, like Charles Griswold, that “forgiveness is necessarily 
connected to the sentiments” or who, like Murphy, comment that forgiveness is “a matter of how I feel 
about you, (not how I treat you)…” See Griswold 2007: 268 and Murphy 1988: 21. This is not to suggest 
that Griswold would disagree with the limit placed on political forgiveness. In fact, for this reason among 
others, Griswold argues that what he calls the scene of forgiveness does not have a place in political life. 
32 Amstutz 2005: 225-227. 
33 Griswold cites the political acts of pardon and debt relief as cases of non-paradigmatic or “imperfect” 
forgiveness: see Griswold 2008. 
34 Digeser 2001: 4-20. The concept of remitting a debt is only one of six possible metaphors for forgiving: 
for a complete list, see footnote 9. 
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 The core of the second objection – that, no matter what the potential benefit to 
social stability, compelling citizens to experience a change of heart is illiberal – is true.  
Governments or other political bodies may enact policies of forgiveness, but they cannot 
legislate the inner life of their citizens.  Furthermore, given that even the promotion of 
certain attitudes and relationships (without sanctions or legal enforcement) may require a 
thick understanding of the common good, communitarians like Amstutz are far more 
likely to be comfortable with primarily affective accounts of political forgiveness than 
those with liberal leanings. But once forgiveness is conceived as a multidimensional set 
of practices rather than a unitary phenomenon, this is not a damning conclusion even for 
committed political liberals.  While government policies may not be able to legislate 
anything resembling a collective ‘change of heart’, they can certainly wipe the slate clean 
so that wrongs are no longer held against the wrongdoers, either in public record or in 
terms of their legal standing as citizens. Government policies can also promote wider 
forgiveness without thereby demanding it as an obligation. Government policies of 
forgiveness might resemble mildly paternalistic safety or literacy initiatives, or 
educational efforts to change a broader social culture of discrimination; there need not 
always be legal coercion or political sanctions involved. Political forgiveness need not 
entail the harmonizing of all interests, attitudes and beliefs, but can merely serve to 
“[bring] matters into a framework within which conflicts can be adjudicated short of 
bloodshed.”35 
 
 This second objection shares a moral intuition with the first: any effort to 
institutionalize forgiveness, in a particular body or through the political representatives of 
larger collectivities, ends up either taking something from individual victims (their 
prerogative to forgive) if they are not involved in the process of forgiveness, or 
demanding too much of them (their emotional commitments, for example), if they are.  In 
both cases, the danger is that individual victims are not given due respect; that is, the state 
infringes on a properly personal matter.  This issue is pragmatic as well as principled; if 
the percentage of the population victimized by past wrongdoings is resentful of a 
particular policy of forgiveness, larger efforts to promote social reconciliation may fail.  
Thus, peace advocates suggest that the distinction between constructive and destructive 
post-conflict forgiveness lies in negotiating some congruence between “sociopolitical 
public statements” and “psychological private readiness” to forgive.  Public policies and 
statements of political forgiveness must remain sensitive to the conditions of other 
members of the offended social or political group; political forgiveness can happen too 
soon or too late, and risk further conflict and casualties as a result.36  In general, a 
successful (constructive) policy of forgiveness must be combined with more general 
policies of social justice and reparations to victims.37 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35Elshtain, 2001: 41. So, for instance, it seems that Ash moves too quickly from a specific policy of 
forgiveness to the assumption that what is entailed, as an end result, is “harmony of all with all.” 
36 Montiel 2000: 95. 
37 Orr 2000: 239-249; Montiel 2000: 201. 
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Third Objection: Groups Cannot Forgive 
 
 The third objection to political forgiveness arises from its close association with 
collective forgiveness.  Persons can forgive, but groups cannot; to argue otherwise, the 
claim goes, is to attribute too rich a notion of moral agency to political collectives.  
Govier deals with this claim at great length, noting that we have no trouble ascribing 
negative moral agency to groups: “many who speak without hesitation of groups hating 
each other, resenting each other, or seeking revenge against each other tend to become 
skeptical when they are told that groups might be characterized by more positive attitudes 
such as compassion, understanding, trust or forgiveness.”38  Since we regularly attribute 
many kinds of activity to groups qua agents, including rational deliberation, policy-
making, decision, and even the ascription of certain attitudes, just how rich a notion of 
moral agency is necessary to forgive? To be forgiven? 39 
 
 Certainly, groups of people can suffer from harm; wrongs done to groups of 
people can be collective or distributive.  And while we may take pains to identify 
individual perpetrators and hold them accountable, there are some situations in which it is 
simply the case that entire groups have either participated in wrongdoing or passively 
acquiesced, while benefitting from the results.  If groups can act to harm one another 
wrongfully, what is the resistance to groups forgiving?  Once again, the answer can be 
found in part within the Emotional Model of forgiveness.  We have less trouble 
imagining a large group electing to have their representatives waive certain claims or 
penalties, or even perform certain gestures or utterances, than we do imagining a group 
granting their representatives the power to overcome resentment, or to have a similar 
change of heart.   
 
But this does not yet explain the asymmetry that Govier describes; why do we 
attribute negative and not positive attitudes to groups?  In the case of forgiveness, the 
answer seems to lie in its elective nature, discussed above – the extent to which many 
decisions to forgive will be underdetermined by reasons.  The phenomenology of 
forgiveness is highly particularistic; insofar as reasons to forgive depend on particular, 
contextual perceptions of the wrongdoer, the wrong, the wider situation and the potential 
moral value in any future relationship between victim and wrongdoer, the extent to which 
different individuals forgive – and the time in which they do it – will vary tremendously.  
Our hesitation over ascribing collective forgiveness is, I suspect, not so much a matter of 
rejecting collective attitudes in general, but difficulties imagining a collective readiness 
to forgive.  More than with many attitudes, forgiving seems to be something that people 
(rightly) do at very different paces and for different reasons, and about which they have 
very different attitudes. But such variation, combined with a general reluctance to disrupt 
the victim’s prerogative, makes it difficult to imagine how, in a large group, all the 
affected individuals could come to the decision to forgive without some level of coercion. 
 
                                                 
38 Govier 2002: ix. See also her contribution to this volume. 
39 Indeed, because Govier covers this issue so thoroughly – albeit from a slightly different understanding of 
forgiveness than the one I espouse – I do not go into substantial detail here.  See Govier, in this volume. 
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 The intransigence of groups would be an insurmountable barrier to forgiveness, if 
all acts of forgiveness required a spontaneous, unanimous and whole-hearted group 
decision. And given that such a happy event is unlikely, there are certainly limits to the 
kind of forgiveness we can ascribe to groups.  Elshtain notes that political forgiveness 
always involves “the painful recognition of the limits to forgiveness, if what one seeks is 
full expiation, a full accounting, total justice, or a kind of annihilation of the past…this 
recognition is itself a central feature of an overall structure of political forgiveness.”40  
Dissent and reluctance are often intractable features of group experience, even at the best 
of times; resentment, recalcitrance and unwillingness to cease bearing grudges will often 
be a significant feature of any collective effort to put wrongdoing in the past.  For this 
reason, I identified potential acts of political forgiveness not only in terms of individual 
policies or events, but also in longer processes of social change and struggle.  The 
multidimensional account is a broad, ‘lowest common denominator’ approach to 
forgiveness; not only the best, most whole-hearted acts of forgiveness are counted as 
such, but also painful, reluctant and resistant efforts to do the same.41  It is an unfortunate 
truth that political forgiveness may see more examples of the latter than the former. 
 
 
Fourth Objection: Acts of Political Forgiveness Lack Appropriate Reasons 
 
 I have described forgiveness as a personal reaction to wrongful harm, described 
the reasons we have to forgive as particularistic, contextual and even relational, and 
argued that the prerogative to forgive is ultimately grounded in our ability to take the 
wrongdoing personally. While I argued above that all interpersonal relationships should 
neither be seen as identical to one another nor necessarily apolitical, it seems intuitively 
true that our political relationships are more formalized and distant (both affectively and 
physically) than most interpersonal relationships. We see family, friends, colleagues – 
and even the stranger who confronts us – face to face, while many political relationships 
are conducted through representatives and media. Given this rather sustained emphasis on 
the personal qualities of forgiveness, can political forgiveness ever get off the ground? 
Perhaps politics and political relationships alone cannot generate sufficient reasons to 
forgive.  Political policies may resemble acts of forgiveness in all other ways, but if they 
lack this necessary property they ought not to be described as such.   
 
In part, any answer to this objection will depend on how we understand political 
relationships.  In the section following this one, I consider a theory of political relations 
that might generate acceptable grounds for political forgiveness: Hannah Arendt’s 
account of political action.42 I turn to Arendt for several reasons. First, she is among the 
first political philosophers to take seriously the idea that forgiveness is a legitimate part 
of the political sphere, and thus the conception of politics she envisions is of particular 
                                                 
40 Elshtain 2001: 44. 
41 I borrow the term ‘lowest common denominator’ forgiveness from Glen Pettigrove, 2004, who cites Iris 
Murdoch. 
42 For a far more detailed and thoughtful discussion of Arendt on forgiveness, please see Guisan in this 
volume.  I am convinced by Guisan’s argument that Arendtian forgiveness, in itself, is insufficient for 
political reconciliation: understanding and promises are also required. However I do not have space to 
consider that relationship here. 
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interest to those of us who want to defend her claim. Second, Arendt writes during the 
period when responsibility for political crimes and repair of historically damaged 
political relationships was beginning to the forefront of international relations, from the 
Nuremburg trials to transitions away from former colonial rule.  Arendt is unstinting in 
her concern for those without political rights or their precondition – what she calls “the 
right to have rights”, and for victims of political violence. Thus, she concerns herself with 
exactly the kinds of political relationships in which forgiveness comes into question. 
Furthermore, her normative account of political speech and action resonates with much of 
what I have described as the work of forgiveness. For Arendt, action and speech become 
political when they reveal the agent who speaks or acts (and thus, represent a risk to that 
agent), when they create or contribute to a new political narrative (i.e. an authoritative 
public record) and when they forge some new political relationship.  Finally, Arendt 
represents a kind of puzzle for philosophers of forgiveness: she advocates its application 
to politics even as she resists any effort to import moral norms or affective, emotional 
standards into the political sphere. Given the difficulties inherent in applying a primarily 
Emotional Model of forgiveness to political situations, it is hardly surprising that Arendt 
has become an appealing authority for those considering forgiveness in political life. 
  
But before turning to Arendt and her account of political action, I first consider 
the objection itself. I have argued that we are able to forgive insofar as we have good 
reason to take the wrongdoing personally, and furthermore, we forgive well if we forgive 
when we have good reasons to do so. There is no reason to think either of these 
conditions is impossible in a political context.  The frequency of ethnic and political 
conflict suggests that many people take the wrongs associated with their collective 
identities and political affiliations very personally indeed.  In situations of political 
occupation, civil war or ideological conflict, individuals will commit themselves to a 
political cause with a fervor and determination that they reserve for little else, even 
sacrificing their lives.  Moreover, the stories that emerge in the aftermath of political 
oppression or violence are often very personal. Molly Andrews recounts how in the 
weeks following the release of the “Stasi” files and under the auspices of the East 
German Truth Commission, opponents of the regime were horrified to learn how their 
colleagues, neighbors and friends had spied on them.43 We have no trouble recognizing 
ways in which these conflicts can be personal; it seems strange to insist that their 
resolution cannot be equally personal.   
 
 Indeed, this final claim resembles the claim that collectivities cannot experience 
positive attitudes of trust and compassion.  Our skepticism is skewed toward constructive, 
positive gestures; we tend not to doubt the reality or the sincerity of their negative, 
destructive counterparts. But political actors, public figures, and spokespeople for 
institutions of authority can have reason to take wrongs personally (and thus, a 
prerogative to forgive) from a number of different positions: as secondary or tertiary 
victims, as relevantly connected third parties, as the sincere, committed, elected 
                                                 
43 Andrews 1999, 110. 
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representatives of the same, or – in some cases – as these and also as primary victims of 
wrongdoing.44 
 
 Of course, it could be argued that while political figures can take things 
personally, they cannot do so in their roles as political figures. In the latter role, they are 
not acting as individual persons, but on behalf of institutions, collectives, states etc. 
Attempts to personalize these roles risk distorting and corrupting their proper, impersonal 
function.  One critique, lodged at acts of public apology as well as public acts of 
forgiveness, is that when political actors make public displays that are meant to be 
personal, they engage in an insincere display of ‘crocodile tears’ or ‘trembling lips’ that 
imports inappropriate tropes from personal life.  We can trust interpersonal displays of 
emotion – in seeking or granting forgiveness, for example – because they are a reliable 
gauge for determining an individual’s commitment to change her behavior, alter her 
attitudes, and otherwise shift her stance. But inasmuch as political decision-making is not 
an individual affair, whatever attitudes and feelings a political figure has regarding a 
particular political decision or policy do not play the same determining role as they would 
in her personal life.45  Instead, public ‘personal’ displays are, at best, a distraction from 
the real political work to be done and, at worst, a strategic ploy for ‘cheap grace’ or an 
easy exit strategy. 
 
 This would perhaps be a troublesome consideration, if it were the case that public 
acts of forgiveness always amounted to public displays of emotion, that is, if political 
forgiveness is conceived along the lines of the Emotional Model. But while ceremonies 
and gestures of remembrance and reconciliation may play a role in a larger process of 
political forgiveness, and while these may include tearful gestures and utterances by the 
parties involved, political forgiveness usually goes beyond public ceremony – and we can 
account for this within the terms of the multidimensional account.   
 
Moreover, it is perhaps a mistake to dismiss the potential sincerity of such 
ceremonies, simply because the close causal connection between emotion and motivation 
we rely on in our interpersonal relationships is not available.  Public gestures of 
forgiveness can mark measurable commitments to future behavior (providing release or 
release from past injustices), can initiate just and compassionate decisions of policy and, 
especially, and can represent an authoritative change to the public record.  Truth 
Commissions find their primary purpose in the need to uncover atrocities of the past; the 
                                                 
44 For example, Nelson Mandela suffered personally under the apartheid regime and, following his release, 
he was able to forgive his jailors as a primary victim, then speak on behalf of South African black 
communities who suffered under apartheid, etc. Mandela is perhaps a rare example, where the multiple 
prerogatives to forgive are almost overwhelming, but many political leaders will stand in at least some 
personal relationship to the political harms that have faced their people. 
45 Other reasons cited for distrusting expressions of sorrow and remorse include the ability of political 
figures to compartmentalize between their own lives and their political work. Robert McNamara spoke of 
this ability at great length in the documentary about his role in the Vietnam War, The Fog of War, 
describing the need to leave decisions of state behind when returning home.  Moreover, decisions made in 
the context of a particular role may affect our self-understanding less than decisions we make in our 
personal life – it is easier to blame the burdens of office, or the constraints of an institution, and we may be 
less willing to incorporate them into a robust sense of our own agency. 
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earliest truth commissions in Chile and Argentina had a specific mandate to investigate 
the disappearance of political activists and opponents of previous regimes.  Donald 
Shriver comments, “to have your story of unjust suffering entered into a public record 
and thence into future history-writing is to experience an increment of justice.”46  In other 
words, personal acts and statements in the public realm are not without reliable standards 
altogether, but their evaluation will be slightly different from that of private utterances: 
we assess them as acts of disclosure, as efforts to take risks on behalf of a potential 
greater good (peace-making), their contributions to public record, and their ability to 
issue new commitments and – in particular – to initiate new and just political 
relationships (i.e. repair).47 
 
 Are there reasons to forgive available to political figures that are at once 
politically appropriate and appropriate to forgiveness?  The kinds of reasons to which a 
potential forgiver might appeal include the nature/extent of the harm and the wrongdoer’s 
intentions, the victim’s suffering and ongoing vulnerability, the wrongdoer’s subsequent 
behavior and the victim’s assessment of how forgiveness might affect it, their pre-
existing relationship and the victim’s desire for future reconciliation or closure. I see no 
good reason why political analogues of these reasons cannot manifest themselves in 
public life: the desire for future reconciliation or closure seems particularly compelling 
reasons in political cases, when the costs of wrongdoing are so high, as does the victim’s 
assessment of her (or their) vulnerability and the wrongdoer’s likely reactions.  
 
 Yet, an opponent of political forgiveness might argue, the point is not that we lack 
good reasons to forgive in political life, but that our good reasons to forgive are somehow 
fatally compromised by the other kind of reasoning that takes place in politics; after all, 
political decisions are almost always strategic. They appeal to necessity, advantage, 
negotiation, power and control.  Even the decision to release (moral or legal) power over 
the wrongdoer, in the form of a release from retaliation of penalty, is always – ultimately 
– a calculation of interests and agendas.  Indeed, the desire for political reconciliation is 
also a kind of calculation; Nelson Mandela admitted that “without these enemies of ours, 
we can never bring about a peaceful transformation to this country.”48 This was not a 
vague or metaphorical realization: the former apartheid regime had only agreed to hand 
over power on the condition of some kind of amnesty.  Political reconciliations thus lack 
the voluntary, unconstrained quality of interpersonal reunions – or at least, interpersonal 
reunions at their best.49 Or so, the final case presented against political forgiveness might 
go. 
 
                                                 
46 Shriver 2001, 37. 
47 Interestingly, these standards of evaluation conform to what Arendt describes as properly political action: 
an act is political insofar as it reveals something about the doer (self-disclosure), is courageous (self-risk), 
produces meaningful narrative (contributes to public record) and initiates new relationships (1958, 236-
244).   
48 Cited in Shriver 2001, 33.  
49 Here, again, I see evidence of a tendency to idealize the interpersonal at the expense of the political.  
Many interpersonal reconciliations take place because of the need to co-exist in shared households, 
neighbourhoods, or workplaces – or because the animosity is too costly for third parties, or because of other 
interests and commitments. 
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Political Grounds for Forgiveness: An Arendtian Account 
 
 In fact, the fourth objection reveals yet another danger inherent in sharply 
dividing forgiveness into mutually exclusive categories of ‘interpersonal’ and ‘political:’ 
our notions of interpersonal forgiveness are all too easily idealized, and treated with 
undue reverence. Here, the multidimensional account – focusing as it does on actual, 
everyday practices of forgiveness – is particularly helpful. In all walks of life and in any 
type of relationship we forgive for a multiplicity of reasons, and these reasons include 
assessments of our own needs, our expectations of remorse and reform by the wrongdoer 
– or the overriding desire for harmony or peace of mind.  We can forgive for self-
pertaining reasons, we can forgive reluctantly and over a long period of time, and we can 
forgive in better or worse ways.  While individual practices of forgiveness may not 
include formal calculations of public relations, material reparations and strategic security 
initiatives, we are capable of taking into account our vulnerability, safety and our various 
needs, in deciding whether to forgive, without hopelessly ‘tainting’ the act itself so that 
its characteristic ‘work’ of relief, release or repair is no longer recognizable.  
Praiseworthy acts of forgiveness express important social values of trust and compassion, 
may alleviate the suffering of all concerned, and may produce better states of affairs, but 
none of these consequences relies on a pure, disinterested act of spontaneous generosity, 
without reason. In other words, the idealized contrast used to ignite skepticism about 
political forgiveness is itself a misrepresentation of actual interpersonal forgiving 
practices. 
 
 Perhaps the skepticism surrounding political forgiveness simply reflects deeper 
skepticism about the moral possibilities of the political sphere: somehow, forgiveness is 
always necessarily too much to expect from politics and, if astonishing acts of political 
forgiveness appear too good to be true, then they probably are.  Certainly, the first wave 
of enthusiasm over the groundbreaking approach of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was followed quickly by a barrage of criticism, much of 
which rightly noted the South African government’s failure to compensate and 
acknowledge victims appropriately, the remaining civil tensions and social violence 
across the country, and so on.  While our personal relationships may involve conflicts of 
interest, selfishness and other calculation, these are balanced by richer relationships of 
concern and mutual goodwill.  In politics, one might argue, the relevant political 
relationship is not substantial enough to generate the kind of thoughtful, contextual 
reasoning necessary to identify truly compelling reasons to forgive.50  The quotation from 
Arendt at the beginning of the chapter goes on to cite as the reason for forgiveness’ 
absence from the public realm, its close connection with the intimate and what she calls 
apolitical relation of love.51 Forgiveness cannot be political because our political 
relationships cannot sustain it. 
 
                                                 
50 Recall, for instance, that the second scenario in which forgiveness might properly be called political is 
when the wrongdoer and victim have no relationship beyond a minimal, political one.  Scenes of political 
forgiveness can be identified by the lack of prior relationship between those involved. 
51Arendt 1958, 243. 
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 Is there a political analogue for the kind of love that Arendt believes grounds 
interpersonal acts of forgiveness? Arendt characterizes forgiveness as one of two 
essentially political faculties; along with our ability to make and keep promises to others, 
our ability to forgive and be forgiven grounds the political will to “live together with 
others in the mode of acting and speaking.”52  That is, forgiveness grounds our ability to 
enter into and sustain political societies.53  For Arendt, forgiveness is not only possible in 
the political realm; it is actually essential. Given a plurality of free but mutually 
dependent individuals, conflicts, competitions and confusions – what Arendt calls 
‘trespassing’ – are inevitable.  Thus, Arendt acknowledges that relationships conducted 
politically will occasionally fall short of what we might want and expect from other 
people, morally speaking. But, she argues, efforts to import private morality into the 
political realm will either fail, or distort the importantly free and plural nature of political 
action and will, in the worst instances, lead to political tyranny and violence.  For the 
most part, politics and morality cannot be reconciled in Arendt’s eyes.54 In other words, 
Arendt is sympathetic to the skepticism about political morality I described above. But – 
significantly – she sees forgiveness as an exception to this general injunction against 
political morality: “[morality] has, at least politically speaking, no more to support itself 
than the good will to counter the enormous risks of action by readiness to forgive and to 
be forgiven, to make promises and to keep them.”55 Unlike most ethical mandates, Arendt 
claims, forgiveness actually depends on plurality: that is, on a multiplicity of agents with 
conflicting interests and wills, all sharing a public space. 
 
 What exactly does Arendt mean by forgiveness? Her account differs from more 
recent philosophical discussions in that she pays little, if any, attention to the emotional 
dimension of forgiving.  Indeed, her very willingness to acknowledge forgiveness as 
political indicates her resistance to anything resembling the Emotional Model. Arendt has 
little time for moral sentiments in politics; she claims that sentiments like pity – while 
virtuous in the private sphere – become vices in politics.56  Rather than a matter of 
emotional change, therefore, Arendt describes the act of forgiveness as a ‘release’ or a 
‘dismissal,’ noting that “without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what 
we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from 
which we could never recover.”57  Forgiveness ‘undoes’ those acts whose consequences 
have bound us – either as the doer or as the sufferer of the deed – and from which we 
wish to escape.  Indeed, Arendt suggests that forgiveness bears the same relation to action 
as destruction does to creation.58  In other words, Arendt’s conception of forgiveness 
resembles the metaphors of relief from burden and remission from debt; forgiveness frees 
us, and fixes the wrong in the past so that its consequences are politically ‘undone.’  
 
                                                 
52 Guisan discusses these two political faculties alongside our capacity for understanding. See Guisan, in 
this volume. 
53 Ibid, 246. 
54 For a longer discussion of the relationship between politics and morality in Arendt, please see Williams 
1998; MacLachlan 2006. 
55 Arendt 1958, 243. 
56 Arendt 1963, 84. 
57 Arendt 1958, 237-8. 
58 Ibid, 238. 
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 Clearly acts of forgiveness, however magnanimous, have no supernatural or 
counterfactual abilities.  They cannot literally undo the events of the past.  Neither does 
Arendt imagine forgiveness to be an act of historical amnesia, in which past traumas are 
covered over and ignored completely. While she describes forgiveness as the opposite of 
vengeance, she also calls it an alternative to punishment, “but by no means its 
opposite.”59 Both forgiveness and punishment have the same function, Arendt argues: to 
put an end to cycles of violent reaction.  But if forgiveness is relevantly like punishment, 
it cannot forsake responsibility and accountability for the past – this would defy the 
purpose of retributive punishment altogether.  Nor would an amnesiac response be in 
keeping with Arendt’s respect for narrative and shared history.60  So the ‘release’ that 
Arendt takes forgiveness to offer is not relief from the very fact of our actions, nor is it 
relief from our accountability for them. Instead, an act of forgiveness is an act that 
prevents the past from continuing to wholly determine the present (as it would in an 
ongoing cycle of revenge and retaliation) and which thus returns us to a condition of 
relative freedom (a condition for the possibility of politics, in Arendt’s eyes). 
 
In forgiving, Arendt claims, “what was done is forgiven for the sake of who did 
it.”61  Forgiveness allows us to assume identities beyond the restrictive ‘victim’ and 
‘wrongdoer’ identities created by the original (wrongful) act.  In a political context, 
where both sides may see themselves as ‘victim’ and the other as ‘wrongdoer,’ such 
identities may freeze debate in an endless litany of wrongs done on each side. Forgiving 
does not mean that the deed vanishes from public memory, however this new, revelatory 
act shifts its original meaning. Just as an apology by the wrongdoer can change the initial 
significance of a wrongdoing, in the eyes of the victim, so too can forgiveness by the 
injured party alter the relationship between the two.  As Andrew Schaap explains, 
Arendtian readiness to forgive displays a willingness to re-enter the sphere of political 
debate with former enemies and combatants, forsaking the apolitical methods of 
vengeance and violence.62 Forgiveness returns the actor and the act to the shared political 
realm.  It does not signal an end or final reconciliation, therefore, but – like all Arendtian 
political action – a new beginning.63  
 
In other words, what Arendt refers to as acts of forgiveness are the renewals of 
trust required to sustain a political space of verbal and not violent disputes.  They are 
grounded in our ongoing commitment to political society as well as our respect for those 
who are our co-participants in it and, as a result, our willingness to trust them enough to 
enter into a space of political action.  Arendt describes the appropriate relation of political 
respect as something akin to Aristotle’s philia politike (political friendship) and also as 
analogous to love in the private sphere; just as appropriate private relationships express 
love, so too do appropriate political relationships express respect.64  Since it concerns our 
personhood as speaking and acting beings, such respect is sufficient ground – Arendt 
                                                 
59 Ibid, 241. 
60 She cites the creation of meaningful narrative as the only appropriate product of political action. 
61 Ibid, 241. 
62 Schaap 2005, 75-78. 
63 “Forgiving…tries the seemingly impossible, to undo what has been done, and succeeds in making a new 
beginning where everything seemed to have come to an end.” Arendt 1994, 308. 
64 Arendt 1958, 243. 
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believes – to forgive others when necessary, and it sits alonside the presumable 
awareness that we, ourselves, will eventually need forgiveness in turn and the trust that it 
too will be offered.65  A culture of mutual political respect is also a method of sustaining 
the personal aspect of the political; Govier acknowledges Arendt’s insight that so long as 
“public life does not become completely depersonalized and maintains a basis for 
respectful relations…we can make sense of forgiveness in public life.”66 Respect, defined 
here as the willingness, however grudgingly, to continue to share an intersubjective 
political world together, can legitimately ground political acts of forgiveness.  As a 
reason grounding decisions to forgive, Arendtian respect lies somewhere between realist 
determinations of sheer necessity and the demand that forgiveness not take into account 
any need to negotiate co-existence, that it be somehow ‘purified’ of any political 
consideration. 
 
 Admittedly, Arendt’s conception of politics is itself highly agonistic.  Political 
citizens live with one another, but not necessarily for one another and will, in fact, strive 
to distinguish themselves against others (in both word and deed).  Therefore forgiveness 
cannot represent political closure; total harmony would mean the end of politics, and the 
ongoing commitment to politics is what grounds and motivates political forgiveness in 
the first place.  In other words, the political sphere cannot, and perhaps ought not, achieve 
the same kind of close reconciliation that some acts of interpersonal forgiveness may – 
though they certainly need not – initiate.  Acts of political forgiveness release us just 
enough to be able to move forward, together.  The meaning of the wrong is fixed in the 
past, so that it no longer continues to determine and dominate the present in cycles of 
violence.   
 
 The relative merit of acts of forgiveness depends, in part, on their relationship to 
and expression of other important moral values: moderation and restraint in retaliation, 
trust, compassion, the alleviation of suffering, moral sensitivity and self-reflection. 
Particularly important in a political context are trust and the moderation of anger and 
revenge.  Arendtian forgiveness-as-release certainly contributes to a political culture of 
greater trust, insofar as it attends to public records and official history, new political 
beginnings, willingness to live with one another.  Charles Villa-Vincencio, national 
director of research for the South African TRC concluded, regarding the potential 
limitations of the Commission’s mandate, “it is important that we all treat one another in 
the best possible manner – that even if we are not fully reconciled to one another, we do 
not kill one another.”67  In other words, the regeneration of trust is a gradual, relative 
matter. Political forgiveness may represent the beginning of such a restoration, rather 
than its conclusion. 
 
                                                 
65 Of course this respect, and the forgiveness it engenders, is not an all-encompassing solution to political 
violence.  Arendtian commentator Michael Janover (2005) comments that while "respect…may be a 
possible grounding for forgiveness in political situations of conflict… we stand in greatest need of the 
circuit-breaker of forgiveness when the ground of respect itself has been shattered by intra-communal 
violence and hatred” (230) – the difficulty is that such respect may have vanished just when forgiveness is 
most needed. 
66 Govier 2002, 80. Digeser also acknowledges Arendt in his account of political forgiveness. 
67 Elshtain 2001, 51. 
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  According to the Emotional Model, concessions like this cannot be genuine 
forgiveness, because they fall short of its expressed goal: the eradication of all resentment 
and angry feeling, and the restoration of goodwill.  But this is a deeply problematic 
political goal and, if we are honest, often an unrealistic personal one.  In accepting that 
we forgive to various degrees of reconciliation and restoration, and that our forgiveness is 
compatible with a certain degree of ambivalence, recalcitrance and anxiety, the 
multidimensional account generates an understanding of political forgiveness that is at 
least amenable to liberal concerns of dissent, expression and autonomy.  Insofar as we 
understand that forgiveness, in any realm, is not immune from considerations of interest, 
security and calculation, the possibility of political negotiation and strategy entering into 
political decisions to forgive does not prevent us from recognizing them as both 
politically and morally valuable.  Furthermore, an account of mutual political respect, 
like Arendt’s, explains how political relationships can be sufficiently ‘personal’ to ground 
and motivate decisions to forgive. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The multidimensional account offers a workable definition of political 
forgiveness that sits within the same framework as discussions of forgiveness in everyday 
life. The standard objections to political forgiveness – that it violates the victim’s 
prerogative, that it is essentially illiberal, that we cannot make sense of forgiveness 
between groups – either do not apply to the multidimensional approach, or are left as 
cautions to policy-makers, and not conceptual obstacles.  There is nothing in the concept 
of forgiveness, understood as a determinate range of moral practices, which prevents its 
cautious application to political conflicts.  In fact, considering forgiveness in social-
political contexts reveals that any sharp distinction between ‘political’ and ‘personal’ acts 
of forgiveness is perhaps more problematic than is ordinarily recognized.  Failing to 
acknowledge the extent to which our interpersonal conflicts are politicized risks 
idealizing interpersonal forgiveness as a spontaneous, unmeasured act of utterly 
disinterested generosity, even while caricaturing political forgiveness: either as a 
radically illiberal effort to impose emotional states on large groups of people or as a 
cynical calculation of power. This caricature not only fails to be faithful to the multiple 
meanings of forgiveness, but also ignores many ways in which political leaders, 
institutions and even collectivities, are capable of assuming the role of forgiver: in 
individual acts and ceremonies, in policy choices, in the values governing widespread 
policy, and the social consequences of political change.  If the political sphere retains the 
common respect Arendt describes, and at least some minimal will to continue to share 
political institutions, forgiveness is potentially both a politically legitimate and a morally 
valuable option for political reconstruction and renewal. 
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